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This  paper  examines  what  I  believe  to  be  the  significant 
developments  in research over the past  ten  years on Japan's saving. 
It is a world that has been turned upside down during this period. 
I hope this paper helps clarify the extraordinary changes that have 
taken place. 
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section motivates 
why Japan's saving is important.  It is followed by a section which 
reviews the literature on the standardization of US-Japanese saving 
rates.  Next comes my analysis of the Japan is special argument as 
applied to saving.  After that I look at heterogeneity  in saving, 
an idea which  I suspect will dominate the research on Japan's 
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saving  for the  next  several  years.  Finally  I end with  a brief 
summary. 
The  Importance  of  Japanese  Saving 
Saving in Japan has been the focus of a great deal of interest 
for  three  reasons.  First,  saving  has  provided  the  funds  for 
investment  that  have  fueled  the  extraordinary  growth  of  the 
Japanese  economy  over  the  postwar  period.  Second,  with  the 
reduction  in net business borrowing  in Japan after the mid-1970's 
and  with  the  increase  in net  government  saving  after  1978,  the 
continued relatively high level of household saving has since 1983 
been translated  into a string of large current account surpluses. 
Third, the Japanese example has been an object lesson for US policy 
makers,  many  of whom  now feel that greater  fiscal discipline  and 
increased private saving in the US would lead to an improvement  in 
the  US's  current  account,  greater  growth  and  increased  US 
international  competitiveness. 
These points will become evident from an examination of Tables 
1 to 5.=  Table  1 presents  a breakdown  of saving,  investment,  and 
saving minus  investment  (this last item represents  the amount  of 
funds available  for investment  in other  sectors  or overseas)  for 
the three sectors in Japan over the postwar era.  Through 1974 the 
1.  Tables  1, 3, 4, and 5 of this paper are updated  and slightly 
modified versions of respectively Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Horioka 
(1989).  Further much of this section of my paper follows Horioka 
(1989) quite closely. 3 
story is a simple one.  A high sustained level of household  saving 
and a modest amount of household  investment  leads to a household 
S-I balance of about 9 to 10 percent of net national product  (NNP). 
The business  sector  during  these  years  is a mirror  image  of the 
household  sector:  modest  saving  and  high  levels  of  investment, 
which  result  in net borrowing  needs  of about  9 to  10 percent  of 
NNP.  In  addition  the  government  sector  typically  runs  a  small 
surplus.  In brief the business sector borrowed massive amounts of 
money  from  the  household  sector  to  finance  its  hugh  investment 
requirements: the government balanced its budget, and there  were no 
current account  imbalances to speak of. 
After  1974  the  net  borrowing  needs  (S-I)  of  the  business 
sector declined several percentage points.  This presumably was the 
result of a reassessment by business of future growth prospects of 
the economy.  In any case over time this became in my view a self- 
fulfilling  prophecy.  The government  in the wake of the first oil 
shock  began  running  huge  deficits.  There  are  two  standard 
explanations  of this.  First, the government was hoping to return 
the  economy  to  its  previous  growth  path  by  the  stimulus  of 
expansionary  fiscal policy.  Second, with the dramatic slowdown of 
the  economy  tax  receipts  dropped  sharply.  By  1979  government 
fiscal  policy  had  turned  around,  and  in fact the  government  ran 
substantial  budget  surpluses  from  1988  to  1992.  Decreased  net 
borrowing by the corporate sector and increasing net saving by the 
government in the light of continued robust household saving led to 
the post-1982  series of current account surpluses detailed  in 4 
Table  2. 
Table 3 is an abridged version of Table 1 but for the US.  The 
figures  in  both  tables  are  those  from  the  official  national 
accounts of the two countries, and no adjustments of any kind have 
been made to them.  Saving and investment  patterns  are much more 
straightforward  in the  US  than  Japan.  The  private  saving  rate 
during the 50's, 60's, and 70's was very steady, averaging  around 
9 percent, and much less than the Japanese private saving rate.  In 
the 80's the US private saving rate decreased  somewhat.  Why this 
occurred is unknown, but this recent decrease has become something 
of  a  red  flag  for  US  policy  makers.  Net  private  domestic 
investment has with some exceptions matched  private saving dollar 
for dollar.  Hence the current account for the most part has been 
driven  by the  government  budget  deficit  or surplus.  It  is only 
since 1983 that current account  imbalances have been a persistent 
political  problem. 
Finally  in support of the third point of the first paragraph 
of this section, I would like to suggest that  there  is a connection 
between saving, investment, and growth.  Actually while it may come 
as something of a surprise to non-economists,  there is no consensus 
among  economists  on how  to model  aggregate  saving  or growth  for 
either Japan or the US.  I will return to this issue later in this 
paper.  Given this lack of generally  accepted models,  rather than 
formally linking saving, investment, and growth, I would prefer to 
appeal  to  the  well  known  empirical  regularity  discovered  by 
Feldstein and Horioka  (1980) that for OECD  countries  in the 1960's 5 
and 70's a sustained one percent  increase in the saving rate of a 
country  induced  nearly  a  one  percent  increase  in  the  country's 
investment  rate.*  A  follow-up  study,  Feldstein  and  Bacchetta 
(1991), indicates that for 1980-86 the above elasticity while still 
substantial is smaller than 1.  It makes sense then to believe that 
extra  saving  will  largely  be  domestically  invested  leading  to  a 
larger capital stock and consequently  greater growth. 
Substantial evidence for this is presented  in Tables 4 and 5. 
In Table  4 we  see  that  Japan's  private  saving  rate  has  greatly 
outstripped  that of the US for every five-year period since 1955. 
Indeed comparing the 38-year overall averages Japan's rate has been 
2.1 times larger than the US's  (17.1 percent versus  8.1 percent). 
When  private  saving  is  broken  down  into  household  and  business 
saving the corresponding  ratios are 2.4 and 1.6.3  Turning to Table 
5 we see that real gross domestic product has increased much faster 
in Japan  than  the  US,  and  again  it  is true  for  every  five-year 
period  since  1955.  Comparing  these  overall  averages  we see that 
Japan's  growth  rate has been  2.2 times higher  than the US's  (6.5 
percent versus 2.9 percent).  Indeed the story is even more dismal 
if we look at per capita growth rates. 
2.  This  is an indirect  quotation  of a statement  on page  201 of 
Feldstein  and Bacchetta  (1991). 
3.  To be more precise these figures are for the 1955-87 period and 
are for saving rates expressed in terms of gross national product. 
See Horioka  (1989), Table  3. 6 
Standardizing  Definitions:  A  Comparison  of  US-Japan  Saving  Rates 
The  work  in  this  area  has  had  a  profound  impact  on  our 
understanding  of  Japan's  saving.  The  pioneering  article  was 
Hayashi  (1986)  I  and he deserves  a great deal of credit  for, one, 
realizing  that  there 
American  and Japanese 
are  significant  differences  in  the  way 
saving  rates  are  calculated  and  for,  two, 
devising  a method  to make  the  saving  rates  of the  two countries 
directly  comparable.  Hayashi's  analysis  has  I  think  largely 
carried  the day among specialists.  However  one should note that 
Dekle  and  Summers  (1991)  sharply  take  issue  with  Hayashi's 
methodology.  Perhaps  it  is not  too  unfair  to  quote  Hayashi  on 
Dekle and Summers (1991): 'IOf  all the points raised in DS, the only 
one  which  I  think  has  any  merit  is  the  treatment  of  Okinawa's 
capital  stock....  As much  as I appreciate  the effort  and  interest 
paid  by  DS,  I view  their  work  as  wholly  misguided.""  For  the 
latest developments  on this topic see Horioka  (May 1994), Hayashi 
(1994), and Iwamoto  (1994). 
To  see  what  this  work  has  bought  I would  like  to  turn  to 
Figures  1 and 2.5  Figure 1 compares the US and Japanese  national 
saving rates from 1955 to 1990.  The gap between the unadjusted 
4.  Hayashi  (1991), pp. 86-7.  The emphasis  is in the original. 
5.  Hayashi  's most recently calculated saving rates, which appear 
in Hayashi  (1994), do not differ significantly  from those shown in 
Figures  1  and  2  of  this  paper  with  two  exceptions.  The  first 
(second) is that the rather erratic pattern of the fully adjusted 
Japanese  national  (private)  saving  rate  in Figure  1  (2) for the 
period  1956 to 1963 has been dramatically  smoothed  out.  The new 
rates  were  not  reproduced  here  since  complete  data  was  not 
presented  in all cases in Hayashi  (1994). 7 
Japanese rate and the US rate has been huge over this period; this 
comes as no surprise given our results  in the previous  section. 
The two rates can be made comparable by adjusting the Japanese 
rate  for government  investment  and  historical  cost  (book value) 
depreciation.  In the US  government  saving  is defined  to be  the 
government  budget surplus  (government investment  is treated  as if 
it  were  zero).  In  Japan  government  investment  is  explicitly 
recognized; hence it must be subtracted off to make the definitions 
agree.  The  second  line  from  the  top  in  Figure  1  makes  this 
adjustment.  It turns out to make a big difference  since Japanese 
government  investment has been in the 5 to 6 percent range of 
in the postwar period. 
The  next  line  down  from  the  top  makes  the  adjustment 




replacement  cost depreciation.  An example will clarify how these 
concepts differ.  If the roof on your house needs to be replaced, 
historical  cost depreciation  is equal to the original cost of the 
roof: replacement cost depreciation  is equal to  the cost of the new 
roof.  Saving  is net  of  depreciation;  hence  in  an  inflationary 
environment historical  cost depreciation overstates saving.  Making 
this  adjustment  reduces  the  US-Japan  saving  gap  by  several 
percentage  points after 1973. 
Comparing  the two lower lines of the graph,  it is clear that 
6.  It also adjusts for capital transfers, which are excluded from 
saving  in  Japan  and  included  in  the  US.  This  adjustment  is 
insignificant  for  the  national  saving  rate  but  does  affect  the 
sectoral allotment  of national  saving  (see Hayashi  (1994)). 8 
Japanese national saving was much higher than US saving in the 1965 
to 1975 period and that  the  saving rates converged in the late 70's 
before diverging  dramatically  after 1983.  Since differing  fiscal 
policies may have affected the saving gap particularly  post-1983, 
Figure  2  presents  the  US  private  saving  rate  and  the  fully 
comparable  Japanese  private  saving  rate  (these are  just the  two 
lower  lines  of  Figure  1  with  the  government  budget 
surpluses/deficits  removed). 
Our suspicions that  the  divergence in national saving rates in 
recent  years  has  been  due  to  differing  fiscal  policies  is 
apparently confirmed.  Also it is easy to observe that the private 
saving rate in Japan during the 1965-75 period was much higher than 
the US's.  Further the private  saving  rate gap has narrowed  very 
considerably  from  its  peak  around  1970  and  has  remained 
approximately  constant  since  1980  at  about  5  to  6  percentage 
points.  In addition  if one adjusts  the private  saving rates  for 
consumer  durables  the gap  is reduced by 2 to 3 percentage  points 
(Hayashi  (1986), Horioka  (May 1994)),  and the  US  private  saving 
rate comes within striking distance of the Japanese rate.  The idea 
that the Japanese private saving rate is high is fifteen years out 
of date. 
The  Japan  is  Different  Hypothesis 
The second area of research  which  during  the past ten years 
has transformed our understanding  of Japan's saving is the testing 9 
of this hypothesis.  In brief there has been a school  of thought 
that  institutional  and  other  factors  peculiar  to  Japan  have 
contributed  importantly  to  the  seemingly  high  level  of  the 
aggregate  saving  rate.  Some of the factors that were  identified 
are:  the  bonus  system,  tax  breaks  for  saving,  the  low  level  of 
Social  Security  benefits,  high housing  prices,  the high costs  of 
education,  the  high  costs  of  marriage,  and  bequests  and  other 
transfers.  The best  surveys  of this material  are Horioka  (1990) 
and Horioka  (1993). 
Although  extensive  research  has  been  carried  out  little 
evidence  has  been  presented  that  any  of  these  factors  have 
contributed  to a high aggregate  saving rate,  and in fact many of 
these  factors  have  been  shown  to  be  insignificant  via-a-vis 
aggregate saving.  In short  the  Japan is different hypothesis is in 
critical  danger  of  being  declared  dead.  I  look  briefly  at  the 
three sexiest factors, bonuses, high housing prices, and transfers, 
below. 
The  definitive  article  on  the  bonus  system  is  Ishikawa  and 
Ueda  (1984).  I say definitive  because  no well  received  study on 
bonuses and saving has been written  since their article appeared. 
Their main  conclusion  is that at most the bonus  system  accounted 
for 15 percent of the personal saving rate (i.e., at most 1 yen out 
of every 6.67 yen of saving was due to bonuses) over the years 1958 
to  1978.  This  conclusion  was  based  on  the  testing  of  three 
different kinds of data: cross section, survey, and macro data.  My 
own opinion  is that their macro  analysis  suffered  from an ad hoc 10 
specification  that  can not be taken  seriously,  that their  survey 
data  results  are  implausible,  and that  their  cross  section  data 
results are weak econometrically.  If my view is correct one might 
ask why this issue has not been seriously reexamined.  I think the 
answer to this is that Ishikawa and Ueda's conclusion--that  bonuses 
at best have played a minor role in aggregate  saving--fits  neatly 
with the preconceived notions about bonuses that most economists in 
Japan hold. 
As with  the bonus  system the number  of interesting  articles 
written  recently  about  the  impact  of  high  housing  prices  on 
aggregate  saving has been small.  The closest  empirical  study by 
far is Horioka  (1991).7  With a few assumptions  he is able to show 
that  the  aggregate  amount  of  housing-related  saving  of  the 
household sector as a whole (net housing-related  saving) equals the 
sum of saving for the downpayment and saving in the form of housing 
loan repayments  (this sum  is gross  housing-related  saving)  minus 
depreciation. 
My  Figure 3 is taken directly from Figure 3 of Horioka  (1991). 
This figure shows housing-related  saving as a percent of household 
saving.  Looking at net housing-related  saving we see that except 
for  post-1982  it  has  been  an  insignificant  share  of  aggregate 
saving.  Indeed during 1965-75 when the national and private saving 
rates were very high housing-related  saving represented on average 
-.9 percent of household saving.  Consequently during 1976-82 this 
ratio became  .5 percent.  The very sharp increase after 1982, a 
7.  Horioka  (1988) is a preliminary  version of this. 11 
period  when  the  private  saving  rate  was  relatively  low,  is 
fascinating  however. 
I would like to turn now to transfers; these are bequests and 
other gifts.  With the publication of Kotlikoff and Summers  (1981) 
the  question  of  how  important  transfers  are  in  the  wealth 
accumulation  process  has received  a great deal of attention.  In 
the case of Japan interest in this was particularly  spurred on by 
the claim  in Hayashi  (1986) that  llbequests  are probably  the most 
important  factor"  in  explaining  Japan's  high  household  saving 
rate.8 
I summarize selectively the available evidence in Table 6.  I 
should say something about  the  three studies listed.  The target of 
all the studies was worker households.  This means that roughly 40 
percent  of  households--the  unemployed,  the  retired,  the  self- 
employed  --were ignored.  The methodology  in all three cases was the 
same, the cumulation  of life cycle saving technique.  The source 
materials  also in all three were consumer  surveys with the Family 
Income  and  Expenditure  Survey  in its various versions  playing the 
largest  role.  Campbell  (1992)  and  Dekle  (1989)  used  standard 
definitions  of transfers;  Hayashi  (1986) did not. 
Reviewing  the results,  Dekle  (1989) found that the share of 
transfer wealth in total household wealth for the four cohorts he 
followed ranged from 3 to 27 percent.  Campbell  (1992) estimated 
that for worker households  as a whole the ratio was between  0 and 
29 percent.  Hayashi  (1986) did not estimate this ratio, but rather 
8.  Hayashi  (1986), p. 167. an annual  flow of transfers.  His flow of transfers  was meant  to 
encompass the entire household sector (he extrapolated his results 
from  worker  households).  He  assessed  the  size  of  his  flow  of 
12 
transfers  in the following  way,  I'Compared  with  the  1974 year-end 
aggregate  private  wealth  of  598 trillion,  it  looks  small.11g  In 
summary these three studies  in fact agree that transfers  have not 
been very significant  in the wealth accumulation  process. 
Heterogeneity  in  Saving 
The last major advance in research vis-a-vis Japan's aggregate 
saving has been the highlighting of the importance of heterogeneity 
in saving behavior  in the US.  The abandonment  of the stochastic 
life cycle model  (Hall (1978)) by the mid-1980's  in the US and the 
more  recent  decisive  rejection  (Altonji,  Hayashi,  and  Kotlikoff 
(1992))  of  the  intergenerational  altruism  model  in  the  US  has 
spelled the end of the simple idea that one paradigm of saving was 
adequate to describe  aggregate  saving in the United States. 
Table 7 demonstrates.the  shocking degree to which the wealth 
distribution  of US saving is skewed and provides powerful evidence 
that models of US aggregate  saving ought to explicitly  recognize 
9.  The  quotation  is from  Hayashi  (1986), p.  190.  While  it  is 
possible  to convert  a flow of transfers  into a stock of transfer 
wealth  if  one  makes  steady  state  assumptions  this  involves  the 
estimation of a number of parameters, so I did not attempt  to  do it 
here.  Horioka  (1993)  in  his  Table  7.7  makes  a  very  rough 
calculation  that  this  flow  is equivalent  to  a share  of transfer 
wealth  of  9.6  percent.  For  a good  discussion  of  these  blow-up 
formulas see Modigliani  (1988). diversity  of  saving  behavior.loJ"  According  to  the  table 
wealthiest  ten  percent  of  Americans  in  1986 
percent  of real  saving  between  1983 and  1986 
full  62  percent  of  the  household  sectors's 
strikingly  the wealthiest  one-half percent of 
for  41.6  percent  of  real  saving  over  the 




and  in 1986 held  a 
assets.  Even  more 
Americans  accounted 
period  and  held  an 
extraordinary  24.4  percent  of  the  household  sector's  assets. 
Contrasted  to  this  the  poorest  ten  percent  of  Americans  were 
responsible  for  -3.3  percent  of  real  saving  and  owned  only  .3 
percent of the assets of the household sector.  Indeed the poorest 
70 percent of Americans as a group actually dissaved  (-20.4 percent 
of  real  saving)  and  only  held  16.8  percent  of  the  household 
sector's  assets.12  It seems then that savers can be divided  into 
at  least  three  groups:  a  substantial  number  who  are  liquidity 
constrained,  a relative  handful  who accumulate  vast  sums and who 
may  play  the  leading  role  in  aggregate  saving,  and  of  course  a 
large number who fall between these two extremes. 
With the rejection of the old models new models have begun to 
be proposed.  Two strands of thought can now be discerned  I think. 
First there are models that incorporate  in one model elements of 
the older competing theories.  Perhaps the best example is Laitner 
10.  Real saving in Table 7 is equal to the real change  in wealth 
over the three-year period.  Hence real capital gains are included 
in real saving; these may well have biased the distribution. 
11.  Table  7  does  not  address  the  important  issue  of  mobility 
within the wealth distribution.  For this see Avery and Kennickell 
(1991). 
12.  This  is  not  to  say  of  course  that  these  70  percent  of 
Americans all dissaved.  Many saved, but  their  saving was less than 
the amount of dissaving  done by others in this group. 14 
(1992),  which  sets  up  an  overlapping  generations  (life  cycle) 
framework  with  altruism  and  liquidity  constraints.  The  second 
strand are models  (or proposed models) that break cleanly with the 
past.  For instance the view of Carroll and Summers  (1991) is that 
savers in the US are either buffer stock savers (the vast majority) 
or the very wealthy  (a small number), with the latter group being 
relatively  more  important  in wealth  accumulation.  Interestingly 
they do not posit any kind of model for the very wealthy.  However 
their  buffer  stock  savers  follow  Deaton  (1990,  1992)  and  are 
identified as the typical consumer, who saves to build up a buffer 
stock 'Ito  smooth consumption over short horizons and to prepare for 
temporary  sharp  declines  in  income."l'  This  is  very  much  a 
departure  from  life  cycle  theory  as  it  is  conventionally 
articulated. 
What significance do these advances have for aggregate saving 
in Japan?  First, they call into question the usefulness of papers 
which presume that one behavioral paradigm is sufficient  to  explain 
aggregate saving.  Second, they make extremely clear that detailed 
studies on the wealth and income distributions  of saving in Japan 
are absolutely  vital.  And,  finally, they suggest  that aggregate 
saving  in Japan  may  be a far more  complex  process  than  has been 
generally  appreciated  to date. 
13.  Carroll and Summers  (1991), p. 339. 15 
Conclusion 
Japan's saving has provided the funds for investment that  have 
fueled the extraordinary  growth  of the Japanese  economy  over the 
postwar  period.  And  in  a  structural  sense  this  saving  is  the 
explanation  for  Japan's  string  of  fairly  large  current  account 
surpluses over the past ten years.  I have also tried to argue here 
that  Japan  is  a  good  illustration  of  the  maxim  that  increased 
saving leads to increased  investment and greater growth. 
Turning to research developments since about 1984, much of the 
difference  in levels between  US and Japanese  saving  rates can be 
attributed  to  differing  accounting  conventions.  When  these  are 
standardized  it becomes clear in particular that the idea that the 
Japanese private saving rate is high is fifteen years out of date. 
In  a  similar  vein  the  death  knell  is  about  to  sound  for  the 
hypothesis that special factors more or less idiosyncratic to Japan 
have  contributed  significantly  to  the  aggregate  saving  rate. 
Finally  in America  it seems that diversity  in saving behavior  is 
important  in determining  aggregate  saving.  If for some years now 
American  and Japanese  private  saving  behavior  have  not been  all 
that  different  it  might  be  the  case  that  diversity  in  saving 
behavior  is  also  important  in  determining  aggregate  saving  in 
Japan.  This  is  certainly  a  line  of  inquiry  that  deserves  the 
greatest  attention. 16 
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:Year  Amount 
1970  1.99 
1971  5.80 
1972  6.64 
1973  -.13 
1974  -4.72 
1975  -.68 
1976  3.71 
1977  10.91 
1978  16.54 
1979  -8.74 
1980  -10.75 
1981  4.77 
1982  6.85 
1983  20.80 
1984  35.00 
1985  49.17 
1986  85.83 
1987  87.02 
1988  79.61 
1989  56.99 
1990  35.87 
1991  72.91 
1992  117.64 
J 
Table  2 
'apan's  Current  Account  Balances,  1970-1992 
(billions  of  dollars) 
Source:  IMF  Statistics  Department  (1993) Table  3 
Sectoral  IS  Balances  in  the  United  States,  1995-1992 
(% NNP) 
Year  Net  private  Net  private  Private  Government  Economy-wide 
saving  domestic  S-I  surplus  S-I 
investment  balance  balance 
1955  8.3  9.3  -1.0 
1956  8.7  8.7  0.0 
1957  8.6  7.2  1.4 
1958  8.4  5.3  3.1 
1959  8.4  7.6  .8 
1960  7.5  6.9  .6 
1961  8.1  6.2  1.9 
1962  8.8  7.3  1.5 
1963  8.5  7.5  1.0 
1964  9.6  8.0  1.6 










1965  10.2  9.3  .9 
1966  9.9  9.6  .  3 
1967  10.2  8.1  2.2 
1968  8.8  8.0  .8 
1969  7.7  8.3  -.  6 




-.  7 
.8 
-.  6 
-.  6 
.  3 




-.  6 
1.1 
1970  8.3  6.6  1.7 
1971  9.4  7.7  1.6 
1972  8.6  8.7  -.  1 
1973  10.1  9.9  .2 
1974  8.7  7.9  .8 
1.1 
.  2 
.4 
.  2 
.  5 
.  4 
-.  3 
-.  4 
.7 
.4 
1975  9.8  4.2 
1976  8.8  6.5 
1977  8.4  8.6 
1978  8.8  9.9 








-.  4 
.  6 
-.  3 
-4.5 
-2.4 
-*  9 
.  1 
.4 
1980  7.7  6.4  1.3  -1.5 
1981  8.3  7.2  1.0  -1.1 
1982  7.8  3.8  4.1  -3.9 
1983  7.4  4.3  3.1  -4.6 




-.  9 
-.  6 
-.  1 
-.  1 
.  2 
-1.5 
-2.5 
1985  7.8  7.2  .6  -3.5  -2.9 
1986  6.4  6.3  .l  -3.9  -3.8 
1987  5.7  6.1  -.  5  -2.8  -3.2 
1988  6.1  5.9  .  2  -2.2  -2.0 
1989  5.1  5.4  -.  3  -1.7  -1.9 
1990  5.2  4.2  1.1  -2.8 
1991  5.9  2.2  3.8  -3.8 
1992  6.1  2.6  3.5  -5.0 
-1.7 
1 
-I:5 Notes  : All figures are in percent of net national product. 
Any discrepancies  in totals are due to rounding  error. 
All items in this table were computed according  to the 
definitions  of the National  Income and Product Accounts. 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce  (1992), (1993a), (1993b), and 
(1994). Table 4 
U.S.-Japan  Comparison  of Private Saving Rates,  1955-1992 










13.3  8.5 
17.7  8.5 
19.2  9.4 
21.3  9.0 
19.9  8.8 
16.9  8.1 
15.2  6.2 
12.6  5.7 
1955-92  17.3  8.1 
Notes: All figures are the arithmetic average of the annual saving 
rates and are in percent of net national product. 
Sources: Tables  1 and 3 Table 5 
U.S.-Japan  Comparison  of GDP Growth Rates,  1955-1992 
Average Annual Growth Rates  (percent) 
Time period  Real GDP  Population  Real Per Capita GDP3 
Japan  U.S.  Japan  U.S.  Japan  U.S. 
1955-59l  8.0  2.9 
1960-64  10.9  4.0 
1965-69  10.6  4.2 
1970-74  6.0  2.5 
1975-79  4.4  3.2 
1980-84  3.5  1.8 
1985-89  4.5  3.1 








.  34 
1.8  7.07 
1.5  9.94 
1.1  9.52 
1.1  4.66 
1.0  3.41 
1.0  2.80 
.9  4.02 








-.  1 
1955-922  6.5  2.9  .88  1.2  5.62  1.7 
'For Japan,  1956-59. 
'For Japan,  1956-92. 
3The real per capita GDP growth rate was computed  as the 
difference  between the real GDP growth rate and the 
population  growth rate. 
Sources: Bush  (1993); Economic Planning Agency  (1988), (1994); 
Management  and Coordination  Agency  (1993); and U.S. 
Department  of Commerce  (1994). Table 6 
Estimates of the Share of Transfer Wealth  in Japan 
Study  Time Period  Definition  Share  of  transfer 
wealth(percent) 
Hayashi  (1986)  1969-74  2.3  trillion  yen' 
Dekle  (1989)  1968-83  KS  3 to 27 
Campbell  (1992)  1974-84  M  0 to 23.9 
KS  0 to 28.6 
'KS represents the Kotlikoff-Summers  definition  of transfer, and M 
represents  the Modigliani  definition. 
*This figure is Hayashi's estimate of the annual flow of transfers. Table 7 
Share of 1983-86 US Real Saving by 1986 Wealth Classes 
Percent Distribution 
Percentile  of 
1986 Wealth 
Real Saving  Memo: Share of 
Wealth 
0  to  10  -3.3  0.3 
10 to 20  -6.0  0.9 
20 to 30  -3.7  1.1 
30 to 40  -3.5  1.9 
40 to 50  -0.4  2.6 
50 to 60  -2.8  4.2 
60 to 70  -0.7  5.8 
70 to 80  8.8  7.8 
80 to 90  13.2  13.3 
90 to 100  98.4  62.0 
90 to 95  14.5  11.0 
95 to 99  30.2  20.6 
99 to 99.5  12.1  6.0 
99.5 to 100  41.6  24.4 







Figure  1 
Japanese  and  US National  Saving  Rates,  1955-1990 
(X of  NNP) 
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Figure  2 
Japanese  and  US Private  Saving  Rates,  1955-1990 
(X of  NNP) 
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Sources:  Personal  communication  from  Hayashi  (April  1994),  Bush  (1990),  (1993). Figure  3:  Aggregate  Housing-Related  Saving,  1963-1989  (percent  of 
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